Anyone left wincing by the $368.8 million (£295.2 million/€347.9 million) net loss disclosed in world football governing body FIFA’s 2016 financial report should prepare themselves for the likelihood of worse in the current year.

Projections in the new document forecast a deficit before financial result and taxes of $489 million (£391 million/€461 million) for 2017.

They foresee shrinkage of the organisation’s carefully-compiled reserves to just over $600 million (£480 million/€566 million) by the end of this year, from $1.52 billion (£1.22 billion/€1.44 billion) as recently as end-2014.

Compare this with the rosy scenario at European football body UEFA, which recently announced a profit of €847 million (£719 million/$898 million) from last year’s Euro 2016 tournament in France.

At current exchange rates, indeed, UEFA’s revenue of €4.58 billion (£3.88 billion/$4.85 billion) for the single year of 2015-2016, equivalent to $4.86 billion (£3.88 billion/€4.58 billion), is within striking distance of the $5.66 billion (£4.53 billion/€5.34 billion) FIFA expects to generate over the entire 2015-2018 World Cup cycle. This would be up only marginally from the $5.4 billion (£4.3 billion/€5.1 billion) recorded in 2011-2014.

Those figures are well worth bearing in mind while you are mulling over evolutions in the balance of power in the world’s biggest sport between Europe and the rest of the world, and indeed between club and country.

What is more, you have to allow for the possibility that the actual outcome at FIFA in 2017 might be even worse.

Notes to the new accounts reveal that the world body - which as we know is exposed to investigations by the United States Department of Justice and Switzerland’s Office of the Attorney General - has inserted provisions of $262 million (£210 million/€247 million).

The provisions are said to cover "various legal matters with respect to disputes of the core business of FIFA".

It is also stated that, "In accordance with acknowledged rules, provisions are recognised if and when an obligation has arisen from a past event, it is probable that FIFA will be required to settle the obligation and a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation".

Will this be the end of the story in financial terms? Only time will tell.

FIFA also acknowledges that while it expects to hit its revenue budget target, "stagnant global trade and subdued investment, combined with investigations surrounding previous FIFA officials, have put pressure on the organisation’s overall revenue generation".

It will not have escaped your notice, moreover, that the next edition of the World Cup - the competition which, for all its attempts to diversify, remains for now the beginning and end of FIFA’s business model - takes place in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Potential knock-on effects of the increasingly unpredictable world geopolitical situation accordingly need also to be borne in mind - and might already be provoking the odd supplementary jitter in FIFA towers.

For all that - and it does amount to a treacherous tightrope - it is possible to discern a way ahead for FIFA President Gianni Infantino in the landscape mapped out by this new set of figures.

The immediate picture looks so dire partly because FIFA has adopted a new revenue standard - IFRS 15 - one of whose effects appears to be that almost all the revenue and expenses related to Russia 2018 will be allocated to the 2018 financial year.

Looking again at those projections for the entire 2015-2018 World Cup cycle, one sees both that a small overall surplus is expected for the cycle as a whole and that a massive profit of almost $1.1 billion (£880 million/€1 billion) (before financial result and taxes) is forecast for World Cup year itself.

Now I would not be at all surprised if the 2015-2018 outcome is, in fact, a deficit.

As we have established, there is plenty of scope for things to go worse than anticipated for FIFA over the next couple of years, and while, under Sepp Blatter, you could almost guarantee that it would outstrip its revenue forecast, this has already been upgraded by 13 per cent this time around.

If significant numbers of fans are discouraged from going to Russia by Putin’s reputation in the west or other factors, revenue might yet undershoot; much will depend ultimately on TV and sponsorship revenues which are supposed to contribute $3 billion (£2.4 billion/€2.8 billion) and $1.45 billion (£1.16 billion/€1.37 billion) respectively of the overall $5.66 billion (£4.53 billion/€5.34 billion).

But if the revenue figures are not stacking up, Infantino has another card at his disposal: he can rein in development spending.

Sure, given what he said during his election campaign, he will need to tread a little carefully if he does decide this option is necessary, especially with another Presidential election due in 2019.

But he ought to be able to portray it as a temporary step, taken reluctantly for reasons of prudence; it is possible too, I fancy, that development money might flow out of the door more slowly than planned as national associations battle to fulfil auditing requirements and other payment conditions.

The Swiss-Italian in any case will have other “achievements” to parade before a future electorate, notably yet another World Cup expansion.

And, partly owing to IFRS 15, the 2018 surplus, to be revealed in the run-up to the 2019 Congress, should make fairly impressive reading even if current projections do end up having to be revised down.

Infantino was elected President on 26 February 2016. Two days later, the FIFA World Football Museum opened its doors; opening it was his first official duty as President.

Envisaged originally as an extension to FIFA’s headquarters in the heady days of April 2012, the Museum ended up being built in Zurich-Enge.

The new report offers some insight into the finances of a project that FIFA’s new management now regards, along with the nearby Hotel Ascot, as “ill-considered non-core investments”.

Museum revenue in 2016 appears to have amounted to $4.66 million (£3.72 million/€4.39 million), to which should probably be added $4.12 million (£3.30 million/€3.89 million) of rental income from apartments contained in the museum property.

Museum costs rose to $22.68 million (£18.15 million/€21.39 million), from $11 million (£8.8 million/€10 million) in 2015. The Museum was also responsible for a proportion of development and education personnel expenses, which rose to nearly $21 million (£17 million/€20 million). The increase of 103 in the number of FIFA employees between end-2015 and end-2016 was attributed specifically to the Museum’s opening.

Depreciation of property and equipment reached $14.9 million (£11.9 million/€14.1 million), up from $1.67 million (£1.34 million/€1.57 million), with the increase “mainly driven” by the recognition of the Museum’s assets. The Museum was reclassified in the balance-sheet from "under construction" to “operational” under an amount of $189.3 million (£151.5 million/€178.5 million).

Museum-related expenses in 2016 also included an impairment loss of almost $14 million (£11 million/€13 million), representing the write-down of certain museum property “as a result of higher running costs [than] expected”.

There was a further $7.9 million (£6.3 million/€7.5 million) impairment relating to Hotel Ascot, purchased by FIFA in October 2014 for $39.9 million (£31.1 million/€37.6 million), "including improvements". This was explained by actual net cash flows being "worse than expected".

The original idea of branching out into the museum/hotel business was plainly nothing to do with Infantino, who was with UEFA at the time.

If he and his team can find a way of exiting either or both operations, hence further increasing room for manoeuvre as FIFA strives to meet what under normal circumstances would be fairly modest financial targets, I would expect them to grab it with both hands.